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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE
A. Course of Proceedings

The facts of this case are more fully set forth in the Appellant's opening brief. On May
29, 2014, the District Court rendered its decision on this case, reasoning that although a bid
could in fact be a trade secret in Idaho, Walco did not take sufficient steps to protect it. R. Vol.
8, p. 1834. Walco appeals this decision because there were sufficient facts in the record to
present the case to the jury as to whether or not Walco had, and took adequate steps to protect, its
trade secrets. Walco filed its opening brief on December 17, 2014. Idaho County and Simmons
filed their Responses on January 30, 2015. Walco now submits this reply brief to clarify several
points brought up by the Respondents in their respective briefs.

II.ARGUMENT
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1. ESTOPPEL WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR DISMISSAL, AS IDAHO
COUNTY AND SIMMONS CLAIM
Both Idaho County and Simmons argue that Walco has waived an appeal of the District
Court's decision that Walco was estopped from claiming misappropriation of a trade secret.

Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 15, Respondent Simmons' Brief, p. 5. They cite numerous
cases explaining that when an issue is not brought up on appeal, that issue is not considered by
the Court.

Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 15-16, Respondent Simmons' Brief, p. 5-8.

Simmons goes so far as to mischaracterize Judge Stegner's decision by stating that, "in effect,
even if the claimed information is a trade secret, Wal co is estopped from making any such claim
against Simmons." Respondent Simmons' Brief, p. 7. This is in direct contradiction to Idaho
County's assertion, that "Walco should be estopped from claiming misappropriation because
Idaho County had a privilege to disclose the trade secret information." Respondent Idaho

County's Brief, p. 15 (citing the second of the District Court's "grant of summary judgment on
two separate bases.")
What the record makes clear is that these two purported "independent" bases for
dismissal are not, in fact, independent at all. They are part and parcel to the same decision.
Contrary to Simmons' reading of the decision, if the Court had found that a trade secret existed,
it would then turn necessarily to the misappropriation issue, not arbitrarily (and unnecessarily)
decide that Walco was "estopped" from claiming misappropriation due to some privilege held by
the County. Respondent Simmons' Brief, p. 7, R., Vol. 8, p. 1834. The estoppel issue was raised
because, under the Court's reading of the facts, Walco's bid did not constitute a trade secret by
virtue of the "way [the bid] was submitted," and because Walco's efforts were not reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its confidentiality. R. p. 1832, 1834. Therefore, under the
Appellant's Reply Brief - 2

Court's reasoning, no trade secret existed because of the way the bid was submitted, and, for that
reason alone, Walco could not claim misappropriation of a trade secret. Id.
Had the District Court found a trade secret on the facts of this case, the estoppel issue
would never have been addressed. Characterizing it as "independent," then, is misleading and
distorts the District Court's decision. The District Court's first ruling is quite clear: it determined
that Walco did not take sufficient efforts to maintain the "confidentiality" of its trade secret. R
Vol. 8, p. 1834. It is that issue which is being appealed here.

The purported "second" or

"independent" basis is that Walco is estopped from claiming misappropriation because Idaho
County had a privilege to disclose the trade secret information." Respondent Idaho County's
Brief, p. 15.

Idaho County only had a "privilege" to disclose the trade secret information

because the District Court found that no trade secret existed due to Walco's lack of effort to
maintain its secrecy. Thus, without the Court's first, and only, ruling, the second would not
exist. By definition, the rulings cannot reasonably be considered "independent."

2.

W ALCO' S BID WAS ASCERTAINED THROUGH AN IMPROPER PROCESS,
AND ITS EFFORTS WERE MORE THAN REASONABLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO MAINTAIN ITS SECRECY
Idaho County and Simmons argue that no trade secret existed after the bids were unsealed

in a public meeting on October 15, 2012. The singular fact that the bids were opened in a public
meeting does not, as the Respondents suggest, per se mean that Walco's bid was "readily
ascertainable by proper means." Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 21, See I.C. §48-801(5).
Furthermore, as the statute indicates, the standard for Walco's efforts to maintain the secrecy of
its bid is that they be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances." I.C.
§48-801(5)(c). This standard necessitates a factual inquiry that must be viewed in light of the
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umque circumstances of this case.

Most importantly, it is a factual inquiry that must be

considered by a jury since there are facts in the record which reveal that W alco took reasonable
steps to protect the bid in question.

A. Walco's bid was obtained by Idaho County through an improper process.
As noted above, I.C. §48-801(5)(a) says that a trade secret must "derive independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being known to, and not readily ascertainable by
proper means ... " Because the bidding process was fundamentally flawed and unfair, and it was
through that process that Idaho County "ascertained" Walco's bid, Walco's bid was therefore
acquired by the county and then wrongfully provided to Simmons through improper means
within the meaning of the statute.
The first argument that Respondents advance is that because 1) Walco's bid was disclosed
publicly, and 2) Walco discussed it in public, it was therefore ascertained by proper means.

Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 21.

The problem with this assertion is the underlying

premise that it presupposes - that just because something is publicly disclosed, the means by
which it was acquired were proper. In fact the opposite is true in this case.
As discussed at length in Walco's opening brief, the County did not follow its own
procedures outlined in the RFP. Appellant's Brief, p. 20. According to its own RFP, the County
was to collect bids, review them for completeness, and subsequently notify bidders individually
if the bid was not complete or needed clarification. Then, and only then, would the county
evaluate those bids which satisfied the minimum requirements. Id., Idaho County RFP, R., Vol.
I, p. 236. Instead, the county failed to follow its own process, improperly acquired Walco's bid,
and then proceed to publicly disclose all of the details to a competing bidder before its' bid was
complete. This not only violated the terms set forth in the RFP, but it also violated the clear
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exemption set forth in the public records act which prohibits disclosure of trade secrets contained
in bids.
What highlighting the RFP is not meant to illustrate, as Idaho County suggests, is some
"baseless" factual assertion of what Walco "anticipated" or "understood" about the RFP process.

Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 32. The process promised by the county is crystal clear. It
was a typical sealed bid RFP which led parties to expect that their bid information would be kept
secret from competing bidders. Rather, what it does illustrate is the improper and fundamentally
unfair nature of the process itself. Highlighting the RFP process is central to this case for one
very apparent reason.

It was this process that was the avenue by which Walco's bid was

acquired. And, of course, the acquisition of the bid is what a jury must consider in deciding
whether a trade secret existed, specifically, whether said acquisition was improper under the
circumstances.
The RFP process has been a center of controversy throughout this case. As cited in the
Appellant's opening brief, the District Court expressed significant concern regarding the process,
stating that he did not feel things were run "according to Hoyle" as far as the process was
concerned.

(Tr. Vol. 1, 12/20/13, p. 50, LL. 21-23.)

Of course, the process itself is not

ultimately the deciding factor in whether a trade secret existed. It is, however, of paramount
importance in this case because it is the first step to the analysis of whether a trade secret existed
in the first place. Idaho County's characterization of Walco's argument surrounding the RFP
process as an attempt to have the Court credit Walco for what it expected or understood about
the process is misleading and an attempt to shift the focus away from the inherent problems with
the process itself. Walco expected what any other company submitting a bid in response to an
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RFP would expect - that the information would not be shared by the county with a competing
bidder before the competing bidders was complete.
B. Walco's efforts to maintain the secrecy of its bid amount were reasonable
under the unique circumstances of this case.
The unique circumstances of this case necessitate that a jury be allowed to consider the
facts and determine if Walco's efforts to maintain the secrecy of its bid amount satisfied the
statute. The District Court erred by taking this factual inquiry away from a jury and deciding the
issue itself. Idaho County and Simmons attempt to discredit Walco's efforts to maintain the
secrecy of its bid amount by trivializing each of the three specific instances that support Walco' s
argument that it took reasonable efforts under the circumstances. Idaho County and Simmons'
perspective on Walco's efforts, however, do not take into account the unique facts of this case.
June 7 letter. First, Idaho County and Simmons insist that the June 7 letter was not a
reasonable effort to maintain secrecy because it did not specifically address the bid submitted in
response to Idaho County's RFP. Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 22. Idaho County and
Simmons advance the same argument they have asserted throughout this case, that the letter did
not specifically identify any proprietary information. Id at 21. However, at the time the letter
was written, it had become clear that communications between Walco and the County were
breaking down, and in fact communicated Walco's intention to withdraw from exclusive
negotiations with the County. As a result, Walco expected the County to initiate a bidding
process, in which competitors would almost certainly be involved. This is in fact the way it
played out. Walco, anticipating that it may submit a bid, communicated the expectation that its
bid would be treated as valuable information that was not to be disclosed to those competitors
who could use it to their own economic benefit. Of course, at the time the letter was written, no
details were known as to what the bidding process would consist of. Walco did the only
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reasonable thing it could do, at that time, to ensure that any future trade secrets, including bids,
were held as confidential and exempt from public disclosure under I.C. §9-340D. Thus, the fact
that Idaho County and Simmons seem to believe that this letter is "irrelevant" because it did
identify any specific proprietary information does not mean that the letter cannot be construed as
one of several reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, to maintain the secrecy of its future
bid amount.
Idaho County and Simmons also assert - with no supporting case law - that Idaho law does
not declare that proposals or bids constitute trade secrets. Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p.
24. They support this contention by drawing the conclusion that the language "contained in"
only exempts from public disclosure trade secrets within a proposal. See I.C. §9-340D. This is a
somewhat confusing argument, apparently drawing a distinction between certain inclusions (i.e.
"contained in"), and the entire substance of the proposal as a whole.
Either way, the result is the same under I.C. §9-340D. Because a bid itself constitutes a
trade secret, it logically follows that a proposal submitted as a bid has trade secret information
"contained in" that proposal or bid. In its opening brief, Walco presented the legal framework
for why a bid constitutes a trade secret, and will not belabor that point in this reply. Importantly,
the abolition of a "continuous use" requirement was made specifically to include non-recurring
information of commercial value, such as a bid. Appellants Brief, p. 6. Thus, because a bid
constitutes a trade secret, and I.C. §9-340D exempts trade secrets including those contained in
response to a public agency requests for proposal, Walco's bid was exempt from disclosure
under I.C. §9-340D.
Walco submitted its bid in a sealed envelope. Idaho County and Simmons also argue that
Walco' s sealing of the envelope is not evidence of reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of

Appellant's Reply Brief - 7

its bid. Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 23. This argument is supported by the assertion
that "when the seal is broken, the seal protects nothing." Id. It also argues that if something
inside the envelope does not identify proprietary information then the "hundreds of envelopes
that Idaho County receives every month could be asserted to constitute trade secrets. Id. This is
a straw man argument, however, meant to distract the Court from the circumstances of this case,
as required to find a trade secret under I.C. §48-801(5). The circumstances of this case are that
Walco, responding to the County's RFP, in which it anticipated would be responded to by
competitors as well, sealed the envelope in which it submitted its bid in order to protect the
information it submitted from being viewed by competing bidders before the bids were complete.

A reasonable inference could be drawn that, to indicate that the contents of the envelope are
valuable and not to be improperly disclosed to a competitor, Walco deliberately sealed the
envelope.

Under the circumstances of this case, a jury could find, and should be able to

contemplate, that Walco sealing the envelope was a reasonable effort under the circumstances to
protect its bid information.
Walco objected when it realized that its bid was being misappropriated. Idaho County and
Simmons argue that once Walco's bid was unsealed, and summarized aloud, Walco did nothing
to maintain the secrecy of its bid information.

Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 26.

Therefore, they argue, such is evidence that it did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of its bid. Id. This argument distorts the record. Walco did all it could to object to the
new bid process, being made up by the county as it went along.
The problem with Idaho County and Simmons' assertion is that, as discussed at length in
Walco's opening brief, a bid is a trade secret that is non-recurring in nature. Appellants Brief, p.
6. The importance of this fact is that once the bid is disclosed, there is nothing left to protect.
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However, Walco did exactly what a reasonable person would do in their position to protect what
was left of their trade secret: protest when it became apparent that it was being used to the
advantage of a competitor.

As soon as Walco realized that Simmons would be allowed to

modify his incomplete bid, using Walco's information as a basis to do so, and return with new
numbers, it protested immediately. R. Vol. 7 p. 1693, 1697.
Idaho County characterizes this as "irrelevant." Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 27.
Because, according to the County, holders of trade secrets fight suspected misappropriation with
injunctions to prevent further disclosure. Id. Apparently, Idaho County believes that further
damage could have been done, and an injunction would have prevented such damage. Under the
circumstances, however, the contention that Walco could have sought an injunction is
completely irrational. What good would an injunction do once the singular, non-recurring trade
secret has already been disclosed, shared with a competitor who is then allowed to use it to his
advantage within a matter of about six hours? The record is clear on this point. Commissioner
Brandt admitted sharing almost all of the information with Simmons, unbeknownst to Walco, by
phone just hours after the bids were opened. (Of course, this is an area of factual dispute as well
since Simmons claims that they only discussed "elk hunting").

R. Vol. 6, p. 1390.

An

injunction, especially in this case, would have done nothing to prevent further damage because
all the damage was already done. Walco was left with only one reasonable alternative given the
circumstances of this case: protest the unfairness of the process and the misappropriation of its
bid. This is exactly what Walco did.
The fact that Respondents believe Walco should have sought injunctive relief reveals an
underlying recognition by Respondents that the arguments advanced by Walco are, in fact,
accurate. If the conduct complained of was perfectly legitimate, and if a trade secret did not
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exist, then Walco would have no right to injunctive relief. By arguing that Walco simply went
about this wrong way, i.e. filing suit after the revelation and use of the trade secrets instead of
seeking an injunction prior to said revelation, Respondents implicitly admit that what they did
was wrong.

3. THE PHONE CALLS AND TEXTS BETWEEN COMMISSIONER BRANDT AND
ROBERT SIMMONS ARE FACTS WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO THE LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THIS CASE
Idaho County and Simmons assert that the emails, phone calls, and text messages between
Commissioner Brandt and Robert Simmons, are "irrelevant to the legal analysis of this case."

Respondent Idaho County's Brief, p. 44. Yet again, the Respondents base this argument on their
incorrect conclusion that no trade secrets existed after the 3 p.m. meeting on October 15. On the
contrary, the communications between Brandt and Simmons are very relevant.
Because whether misappropriation exists is a factual matter which a jury can infer through
circumstantial evidence, a jury should be allowed to consider the communications at issue here.

See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 235 P.3d 749, 763 (Utah 2010). Certainly, phone calls
between the County and one of the bidders totaling 42 minutes, on the very evening that bids
were unsealed, is just one example of a fact that should be heard by a jury contemplating whether
misappropriation exists. Further, Brandt specifically stated in his deposition that he had Walco's
proposal in front of him and was sharing details contained within it while he was talking on the
phone with Simmons. R. Vol 5, p.1218.

Simmons disagrees and says they discussed "elk

hunting". R. Vol. 6, p. 1390. The disparity of recollection regarding this call reveals that one
party clearly believed he was obtaining information that he ought not have since he knew, at the
time he was obtaining the information, that he would later use it in a manner inconsistent with
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the law.

All this of course occurred prior to a contract being awarded and prior to Simmons

completing his bid. Appellants Brief, p. 17. Disparate recollections regarding a phone call in
which trade secrets were improperly revealed is a matter to be considered by a jury since a
reasonable inference to be drawn from said facts is that Simmons knew he was obtaining
information he should not have and then lied at his deposition to cover it up.

ill. CONCLUSION
The statutory analysis for finding a trade secret boils down to two essential elements.
The trade secret must 1) derive independent economic value from not being known to or not
being readily ascertainable by proper means, and 2) must be the subject of efforts reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. I.C. §48-801(5). Here, Idaho County and
Simmons acquired Walco' s bid improperly by way of a process that significantly deviated from
the promises made in the RFP. Under the unique circumstances of this case, Walco took several
reasonable steps, all of which must be considered by a jury, to maintain the secrecy of its bid
amount.
Through not acting in accordance with its own RFP, upon which Walco reasonably
relied, Idaho County improperly acquired and intentionally disclosed to Simmons the trade secret
it obtained in violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, §1.C. 48-801(2). Idaho County further
distorted the process in refusing to treat Walco's bid as exempt from public disclosure under I.C.
§9-340D, as Walco specifically requested. Thus, material facts exist that Idaho County violated
the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, and a jury should be able to hear those facts.
Simmons is also liable to Walco for misappropriation of a trade secret in violation of
§1.C. 48-801(2). A reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts supports the allegation that
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he obtained information he knew was wrongfully disclosed to him, as evidenced by his
dishonesty in explaining the phone call with Commissioner Brandt on the day the bids were
opened. The fact that he demanded an executive session to discuss his information that was not
provided in his initial bid is further evidence that a jury should be permitted to consider in
deciding whether he knowingly used information he knew to be obtained wrongfully.
Accordingly, Walco respectfully reaffirms its request that this Court reverse and remand
the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of March, 2015.

Attorney for Walco, Inc
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